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At the Labor Day pigeon shoot in Hegins, Pennsylvania, 
thousands of emaciated birds are released from trap 
boxes to be shot and killed by drunken Americans or 
wounded and then suffocated by their sons, all following 
a patriotic execution of the national anthem. In the 
preface of Animals, Property and the Law, Gary 
Francione relays a personal account of the spectacle. 
This review of Francione's book also begins with a 
personal account. 
In 1992, the Canadian city of Toronto, inspired by 
evidence of the cruelties to exotic animals inherent in 
the circus and of the accompanying risks to human safety, 
passed an amendment to an existing by-law and thereby 
prohibited the keeping of certain exotic animals in the 
city. Included among the prohibited species were those 
that are commonly used in circuses, such as elephants, 
monkeys, apes, lions and tigers. Ringling Bros. and 
Garden Bros. circuses, along with the corporation which 
owns the Skydome, Toronto's largest stadium, 
challenged the amendment to the by-law in court and 
ultimately succeeded in having it struck down. l 
In order to combat some of the undesirable press 
about the lives ofcircus animals which arose at the time, 
the Garden Bros.' first visit to Toronto post-court case 
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included an opportunity for audience members to go 
behind-the-scenes and see some of the animals before 
the show. Not all of the animals were on display. The 
monkeys, living in small, enclosed metal boxes, were 
not available for public viewing. 
Several elephants, however, were visible immediately 
upon entering the area. They were chained by a front 
and a back ankle and could barely move as a result. In 
one hour, I heard eight children ask their parents why 
the elephants' legs were chained and eight parents 
respond that it was for the child's own safety and that 
the animals were not being hurt. When I tried to talk to 
the children about their observations, the parents 
moved them away only slightly more politely than they 
would from a pedophile. 
The innocent observations of children have been 
adequately sentimentalized elsewhere; suffice it to 
observe for present purposes that there is something 
that happens to humans between the stages ofchildhood 
and adulthood, something that induced these adults to 
abandon their own inclinations, their very observations 
and any memory of the articles they had recently read 
in the paper about why the by-law was passed in the 
frrst place, to a belief that everything was all right. 
Perhaps the parents assumed that this way ofholding 
the animals was temporary, or perhaps they chose not 
to wonder how else the elephants might be held and 
transported. Their response was of course a result of 
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many psychological, sociological and economic 
components which are slightly, but only slightly, beyond 
the scope of this book review. Certainly one of the 
factors which facilitated their reaction was a 
fundamental belief in our system of laws to prevent 
harms from being caused; they were no different than 
their fellow members of society who believe that the 
justice system is both intended to be and is successful 
at preventing evils. 
In 1993, ninety million new cases were filed in 
America's state courts.2 Litigation has become a way 
of life, and our faith in it verges on religious. It is this 
faith in the system, and in the very notion of state-
enforced justice, which begins to erode as one proceeds 
through Francione's book. 
H is not always easy or desirable to say whata book 
is about in one sentence, but here it is both: Francione's 
intention is to show that in the American legal system 
(his comments are equally applicable in Canada) where 
animals are property and humans are property owners, 
animals do not and cannot have rights. Most juris-
dictions in the country have laws which seem at ftrst 
glance to protect animals, but when one contemplates 
the nature of the legal system and what interests the 
law is seeking to protect, it becomes an irrefutable 
proposition that animals lose out whenever humans 
want to exploit them. 
In making his point, Francione is trying to speak 
to parents and activists as well as to scholars and 
lawyers. He exposes legal principles without relying 
on the sort of jargon that makes other books about 
law incomprehensible or uninteresting to non-lawyers, 
and he offers a compelling analysis of the structure of 
the legal system which is universal in its possible 
applications. He happens to be writing about animals, 
but those who concern themselves with other dis-
empowered groups should be attentive to his critique. 
The book is presented in three parts. The second 
and third parts offer specific examples to prove the 
thesis established in the first. Part I is arguably the 
most important, as it comprises an examination of the 
general way in which human behavior in respect of 
animals is determined in accordance with our rules 
about property ownership and includes a discussion 
of both the origin and the effect of animals' status as 
property. While those who contemplate animal issues 
often start from the position that property status was 
established in the biblical reference to man's 
"dominion" over the animals and ripened in Cartesian 
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rationalism, this is too simple an analysis of a complex 
process that may in fact have occurred over many 
millennia and has had ramiftcations too important to 
be casually underSITOod. 
Francione's approach reminds readers to consider 
well-known religious and philosophical sources in 
context and in combination. He ftnds early traces of 
the current ideology in classical antiquity and comments 
as well on the importance of John Locke, who connected 
the theological assumption that god gave animals to 
humanity with the economic perspective befitting his 
ideology: god gave the animal species to mankind (the 
gender term is intentional), but man cannot make use 
of the animal gift unless an individual man can claim a 
right to an individual animal. 
In fact, Francione notes other writers who have 
offered the possibility that our very notion of property 
may have developed around the commoditization of 
cattle (the word "cattle," for example, comes from the 
same etymological root as "capital"). 
John Livingston, in discussing the consequences of 
the process of self-imposed human domestication in his 
book Rogue Primate, devotes considerable thought to 
evidence of human domination and domestication of 
nature having emerged long before Aristotle and even 
earlier than the da"m of sedentarism and agriculture. It 
would be interesting to hear more from Francione on 
this point; his thoughts in this volume are incisive but 
brief. Understanding both the source and sustenance of 
the current ideology is crucial to those who seek to 
dismantle it. As Animals, Property and the Law subtly 
proves, it is perception, as a precursor to or ideally as 
an alternative to law, which must be the focus of any 
further efforts toward change. 
The current dualistic paradigm, in which humans 
are on one side of the equation and everything that is 
nonhuman is on the other, is contradictory to say the least, 
and Francione exposes the paradox. While everybody 
claims to be opposed to cruelty to animals and while the 
law purports to reflect this concern by way oflegislation 
that prohibits unnecessary suffering and requires 
animals to be treated humanely, it is permissible to 
routinely subject them to barbaric behavior. 
In presentday North America we take property rights 
quite seriously.3 Humans own property: land, cars, 
furniture, stock in corporations. Animals are property: 
models in experiments, machinery in food production, 
exhibits in zoos... Resolution of any conflict between 
the interests of a property owner and any interest we 
73 Between the Species 
Review ofFrancione's Animals, Property and the Law 
may allribute to her animal property has been 
determined by our characterization of the parties at the 
outset Our justice system, whose raison d'etre is the 
protection of our interest in property, is uninterested in 
the life of the property itself. There are restrictions in 
law on our use of animals; however, there are 
restrictions on the use of all property (I have all of the 
rights associated with ownership over my pen, however, 
1may not generally use it as a weapon), and there is no 
concern for the animal herself at the law's core. 
While the normative assumption that animals exist 
for human ends goes unchallenged, courts and 
legislators do recognize a distinction between animate 
and inanimate property: notions of"humane" treatment 
and "unnecessary" suffering are superimposed on the 
scheme of regulations. However, the key to legal 
terminology is interpretation, and "unnecessary" and 
"inhumane" are interpreted in light of the existing legal 
status of animals as property and the lengths to which 
we are willing to go (Le., constitutional guarantees) to 
preserve the capital "p" in Property. 
Examples are abundant: corporal punishment of the 
dog is necessary to train her not to mess in the house; 
death by electrocution is necessary to protect the fox's 
coat; chaining the ankles is necessary to control the 
circus elephant. Francione finds an example in the food 
industry. While it has for many years been lawful to 
brand and castrate food animals without anesthetic, to 
say nothing of myriad other daily abuses suffered as 
they are fattened and delivered for slaughter, these being 
practices "necessary" to the efficient process of food 
production, those who have let their cattle starve to 
death, thus allowing resources to be wasted, have been 
convicted of cruelly. 
An event which attracted much media attention since 
the publication ofAnimals, Property and the Law further 
illustrates the point Consider the excitement around 
the outbreak ofBSE, better known as Mad Cow Disease, 
in Britain in the spring of 1996. Front page media 
reported all of the concerns regarding human safety 
(what was the cause of the disease, where had it spread, 
what people might be exposed to it) and economic loss 
(the effect on Britain's economy of a European ban on 
beef and any products tlmt might contain any amount 
of beef by-products, where will the animals be 
slaughtered, who will reimburse the farmers) with a 
distinct absence of any discussion of the cows 
themselves (whether or how the animals could be 
treated, where they might live out their lives, what are 
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these cows being fed anyway). As soon as her value in 
food production was destroyed, so was the cow. 
Using the above and other examples, Francione 
reveals two important truths. First, the existing 
regulation of animal use never exceeds the degree of 
protection which facilitates the most economically 
efficient exploitation of the animal. Second, absolutely 
no conceivable treatment ofan animal is illegal, so long 
as it is administered in the approved economic comext 
The analysis reveals another distasteful effect of a 
structure whose major interest is economic, namely lllat 
it accepts certain behavior which is common among its 
elite supporters, those with lots of property, but refuses 
to accept corresponding behavior on the part of the 
disempowered property-less. Francione compares the 
illegality ofdog fighting, which is more common among 
the latter, to horse racing, which is favoured by the 
middle and upper classes. 
He also tells in some detail the story of the prosecution 
of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye by the City of 
Hialeah, Rorida. The members of the church, nmnbering 
in the hundreds of thousands or millions of people in 
the United States, practice Santeria, a religion which 
involves the ritual sacrifice of animals. The members 
of the church are also primarily black. The city's attempt 
to stop the sacrifices by way of the state anti-cruelty 
law, although ultimately unsuccessful, cannot help but 
illustrate the distinct absence of prosecution of other 
rituals by which animals in the United States are 
systematically brutalized. The suffering of animals in 
food production, science and entertainment would 
appear to be authorized by a more popular bible and 
celebrated by a more powerful congregation. 
Francione calls the phenomenon summarized 
above "legal welfarism," which he specifically 
describes as a normative theory implicit in the law, 
whose fundamental assumptions are never challenged, 
according to which it is morally acceptable, at least in 
some circumstances, to kill animals or subject them 
to suffering, as long as an effort is made to ensure that 
they are treated humanely. The fact that we operate 
on the basis of the status quo without ever questioning 
underlying assumptions in the law is a theme that 
recurs in the book and should be recurring more subtly 
and on a broader scale in the reader's mind while 
proceeding through it 
Francione posits tJmt legal welfarism establishes a 
strong presumption in favor of a general theory of 
animal welfare, the view that it is morally acceptable, 
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at least in some circumstances, to kill animals or subject 
them to suffering as long as the treatment is as humane 
as possible. Legal welfarism also generates a strong 
presumption in favor of letting the owner determine 
what uses best maximize the value of the property and 
what treatment is ''necessary'' for her particular purpose; 
the animal user thus becomes the real judge of whether 
her own behavior is lawful or not. 
This analysis coincides with a concern regarding 
specialization that has been leveled by thinkers in 
various disciplines, namely that we have discarded our 
independent existence in exchange for reliance upon a 
collection of experts. We accept (in a technological age 
this is unavoidable to a certain degree) largely 
unchallenged their advice on problems in their selected 
field. We are no longer expected to think for ourselves. 
Nor, as domesticated animals, do we have any interest 
in doing so anyway. 
One distinction that is not clear in the book is 
between those whose ideology is what Francione has 
called "legal welfarism," and those who choose what 
might be identified as welfarist methods despite a 
belief that animals ought not to be seen merely as 
means to human ends. The former group includes 
animal users who are likely to feign an interest in 
animals' well-being in response to growing pressure, 
while the latter might well be comprised of people 
whose motivation is sincere and who are willing to 
consider what are perceived to be welfarist steps with 
the intent, perhaps misconceived, of achieving 
improvements for animals incrementally. 
This latter position can neither be summarily 
endorsed nor dismissed; many committed and creative 
minds are presently busily occupied in attempting one 
or the other. I seek here only to point out an important 
distinction, between those who are motivated by self-
interest and those who are inspired by an interest in 
others, that should have been acknowledged in this work 
and which is more thoroughly addressed in Francione's 
next book, Rain Without Thunder, The Ideology ofthe 
Animal Rights Movement.4 
In addition to considering whose use of animals does 
and does not interest the court and the nature of the 
analysis which the court will apply upon arrival, there 
is another question. Who gets to bring her concern about 
animal use to court in the first place? Not just anybody 
can complain to ajudge about anything; one must prove 
that she is specifically affected by a particular fact 
situation to be entitled to the court's attention. 
Winter & Spring 1996 
Francione's discussion of the concept of "standing," 
which is the doctrinal license by which a person presents 
her complaint in court, demonstrates that this has been 
the ideal mechanism for keeping human/animal 
conflicts out. Just as a chair could not complain about 
how its owners treat it, so are claims asserted on behalf 
of animals dismissed by courts as absurd. As property, 
animal interests are simply beyond the court's reach. 
This despite the fact that plenty of others who are unable 
to advance complaints on their own behalf, such as 
children, the mentally disabled and corporations, do so 
all of the time by way of representatives. 
As mentioned above, Francione's thorough 
examination of anti-cruelty cases in the second part of 
the book helps to prove his thesis and verifies that any 
inquiry into any type of animal use ends as soon as the 
user says that a particular use of an animal is necessary 
for her purpose, be it scientific, industrial, recreational 
or entertaining. Nobody wants an animal to suffer 
unnecessarily, but we refuse to convict those responsible 
for mule diving, bear wrestling or bow hunting. 
In the third part of the book, the focus is on the use of 
animals in experimentation. Has the celebrated American 
Animal Welfare Act been a useful tool in the attempt to 
get animals out of research? Consider the following: 
When I was studying atGottingen, Blumenbach 
spoke to us very seriously about the horrors 
of vivisection and told us what a cruel and 
terrible thing it was; wherefore it should be 
resorted to only very seldom and for very 
important experiments which would bring 
immediate benefit. .. Nowadays, on the 
contrary, every little medicine-man thinks he 
has the right to torment animals in the cruelest 
fashion in his torture chamber so as to decide 
problems whose answers have for long stood 
written in booJlcs into which he is too lazy and 
ignorant to stick his nose. 
Neither the nature nor the number of experiments 
conducted in the name of science has improved since 
Schopenhauer wrolte this passage one hundred and fifty 
years ago.5 Ironically, it is by way of this most heavily 
regulated animal use that animals are most horribly made 
to suffer. The very title of the federal Animal Welfare Act 
is misleading, in that the Act does nothing to serve the 
interest of animals. On the contrary, it serves the doubly 
harmful purpose of, first, entrenching as acceptable the 
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use of animals as tools in experiments without ever 
questioning the propriety ofsuch behavior, and, second, 
creating a public perception that there are laws in place 
to ensure animal interests are being looked after. 
Readers of Francione's book might be surprised to 
learn that the Act came into being to address the 
complaints of people whose pets were being stolen for 
use in research. Many years later, a major emphasis in 
the Animal Welfare Act and in the equivalent legislation 
of other jurisdictions continues to be on the facilities 
which supply the animals to be used. 
Animals, Property and the Law is at once compelling 
and depressing as a result of all of the above and of the 
sickening examples of lawful, institutionalized abuse 
cited. Despite or because of this, it is a book that ought 
to be read by everyone who has ever wondered, Aren't 
there laws against that kind of thing? Francione 
disabuses the reader of her constructed belief that the 
law is making sure that the elephants are not being hurt. 
In sum, perhaps the most important statement of the 
book is found in the introduction, where Francione 
observes that "(o)ur legal system is quite adept at 
making it appear as though disenfranchised groups 
receive legal protection. By directing our attention to 
issues that are often quite tangential, legal discourse 
steers clear of the more important fundamental moral 
and economic assumptions upon which the legal system 
ultimately rests." 
Terms such as "due process" and "equality before 
the law" are solemnly invoked by judges and lawyers, 
but these serve essentially as distractions. With the 
discussion framed in normative terms and our minds 
focused on the minute particulars of the process, we 
are entirely distracted from the very acts which the court 
is believed to be scrutinizing. As Chomsky and others 
have amply demonstrated, distractions are a powerful 
tool of the ruling elite.6 Keeping the minds of the masses 
far away from reality protects the behavior by which 
the corporate structure derives its profits. 
The argument that protection of a particular group 
will never exceed that which is needed to most 
efficiently exploit its constituents is familiar to anyone 
who has ever read Marx. The legal system uses not only 
animals; they are just the best example of the 
phenomenon, as they are the weakest group and the 
only one without any human members as constituents. 
Therefore, all argument must be advanced on their behalf. 
Most of Francione's analysis could be articulated, 
and some of it certainly has been, by opponents of 
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sexism and racism and other forms of discrimination. 
However, this is a new application of a critique that 
has previously been reserved for humans, and to make 
it credible, Francione has had to go beyond the level 
of discourse at which human rights activists have been 
engaged. Unlike other criticisms made by individual 
segments of society for their unique benefit, the 
principles established in this book are all-encompassing. 
The result is a critique which speaks ofanimals but to 
the entire animal kingdom and suggests, without 
making the direct argument, that solutions to the 
disharmony in North American society are not 
effective when fragmented. 
Francione's opposition to legal welfarism is not an 
attempt to improve animal welfare but to replace the 
paradigm by which we understand human/animal 
relations in the first place. He invokes rights theory as 
a mechanism of ensuring that animals not be treated 
merely as means to an end. The notion of "rights" is 
clearly enunciated. A right is explained as some value 
that requires respect, whether or not exploitation of that 
other would be beneficial to someone else. It is a barrier 
between the right-holder and everybody else. 
Regan's philosophy is invoked. Regan rejects the 
welfarist approach (as well as the utilitarian and other 
consequentialist approaches more thoroughly described 
in the book) and argues that humans and nonhumans 
possess equal inherent value precisely because of one 
crucial similarity: they are the subject of a life, a life 
which is meaningful to the being regardless of that 
being's value to everybody else. 
This does not mean that humans and animals should 
have the same rights or that any rights are more absolute 
than others. Regan acknowledges that under his subject-
of-a-life regime, conflicts will arise, just as they do 
among humans, and have to be resolved. "Rights" simply 
means an entitlement to be treated as an end in oneself, 
rather than as a means to the end of someone else. 
A perfect jurisprudential example cited by 
Francione is the nineteenth century case of Dudley & 
Stephens, where two sailors stranded at sea with 
basically no food or water killed and ate their 
companion. Rescued shortly thereafter, the two men 
were charged with murder and attempted to raise a 
defence of necessity. The court refused to consider the 
argument. Humans have the basic rights which cannot 
be crossed, no matter what the benefit to others, which 
Francione seeks to extend to animals; there are some 
interests that are simply not up for grabs. 
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The fIrst read of the book leftme slightly disappointed; 
convinced that efforts toward change have been 
misconceived, and thoroughly sickened by gruesome 
examples of lawful animal abuse peppered throughout 
the text, I got through the experience convincing myself 
that there would be a happy ending, or at least insight 
on how to go about achieving one. Upon further thought, 
that sophomoric response was replaced by a realization 
that Francione had achieved exactly lhe effect he sought; 
he persuaded a reader that the present legal system will 
not be a tool of animal liberation. 
The view that rights theory would be better than the 
present state of affairs was also convincing. What is 
needed is not an improvement in the condition of 
animals used by humans but a willingness to take the 
animal's own interest into account when making a 
decision that will affect her life. To that extent, rights 
theory is instructive. However, before misconceivedly 
investing further efforts toward achieving legal status 
in the present system, one must consider whether 
success in that regard would be much of a coup. There 
are problems with this system, with its adversarial nature 
and "rights" terminology, some of which have been 
identifIed in this book. 
Plenty of disenfranchised groups have labored for 
and ostensibly achieved the status of right-holder, but 
has this liberated them in the true sense? Being told, 
for example, that one has rights and having the 
resources to assert them are two different things. While 
Francione is absolutely right that "rights" is the 
language of the existing structure, is the existing 
structure the ideal to be pursued? 
Other approaches have been suggested by 
feminists and Marxists, for example. These are 
alluded to by Francione in passing but not explored. 
This is unfortunate, as it is not merely a matter of 
semantics: rights vs. welfare vs. ethic of caring; the 
underlying ideas which inform the terminology are of 
prime concern. Despite his essential criticism of 
normative assumptions, Francione dismisses the ideas 
offered by feminism or Marxism and insists upon 
continuing the dialogue in terms of "rights" as "rights 
are important normative notions that we use to discuss 
the level of both moral and legal protection in 
particular circumstances." Other options should not 
be so readily ruled oul. 
Ullimately, the solution to the problem of human 
domination is beyond the scope of the "rights vs. 
welfare" debate, or of anyone book. In putting the 
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emphasis on underlying assumptions, Francione has 
focused our attention in the right direction. One cannot 
legislate desirable behavior upon a group of people 
that has no interest in following nor any idea of why 
they are being told to behave inconsistently with their 
own beliefs. 
The antiquated manner of trying to correct 
undesirable behavior by punishment has never been 
successful. The exponential growth of the incarcerated 
populations of the United States and Canada has not 
resulted in a corresponding reduction in the number 
of "crimes." Laws aliter only the behavior of society's 
most timid, who were probably not causing much 
trouble in the fIrst place. They do not stop individuals 
or corporations who are wealthy enough to find ways 
of exceeding the law's grasp, nor has any murderer 
ever hesitated before the kill to consider the possible 
legal consequences of the act. The concept of 
punishment as a deterrent to murder, be it prison or 
capital punishment, has long been recognized as a 
disguise for the "eye for an eye" vengefulness endorsed 
by the Bible and enthusiastically pursued since that 
book's fIrst publication. 
Deconstruction of the assumptions on which the 
system rests is a process which is not merely legal but 
spiritual in nature, and it is not an amendment but an 
evolution of ideas which must occur before we see the 
end of elephants in circuses. 111is is a lengthy process 
which will occur over historical time. A generation 
whose most open-minded look to the Celestine 
Prophecy for spiritual guidance is still lOo gratefully 
manipulated by rhetoric. 
One cannot help but realize that the failure on the 
part of many advocates to be able to think in tenus of 
this kind of historical time contributes to the problem. 
Animal advocates are certainly not alone in seeking band-
aid solutions; consider food banks and homeless shelters, 
foreign aid to "developing" countries, prisons, all of 
which are promoted by at least some well meaning 
advocates but which, rather than contribute to any long 
term solution, entrench and prolong the predicamenl. 
Those committed to cbange mustbe prepared to persevere 
with their criticism wilhout seeing results in their lifetime. 
Francione seeks to do for animals what Mary 
WollslOnecraft didl for women at the end of the 
eighteenth century, expose the fallacious assumptions 
about them and the arbitrary distinctions which underlie 
our daily behavior. With intellectual eloquence, despite 
the dry nature of some of the areas he must discuss to 
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prove his point, Francione tells us that change is less 
frightening than the status quo. 
However, just as Wollstonecraft's incisive 
commentaries are, two hundred years later, only 
beginning to be acknowledged by some and still widely 
resisted by others, so too is the kind of change which 
Francione seeks to inspire going to occur over historical 
time. At this stage of consciousness of the Western 
human, with its love of television and marketing and 
all things litigious, simple exposure to Francione's ideas 
is a happy ending in itself. 
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